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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At age twenty-one, Abigail Kathleen Burroughs met a fate usually reserved for 
aged men who have spent much of their lives drinking and smoking.1  Diagnosed 
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with cancer at age nineteen, Abigail battled the squamous cell carcinoma that 
invaded her body even as she struggled to maintain her characteristic optimism.2   
Abigail struggled with more than her illness, however.3  In the last years of her 
life, Abigail and her family also wrestled with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
regulations that denied her access to medication that could have saved her life.4  The 
policy at issue was the FDA’s practice of progressive testing, which requires that 
experimental drugs pass at least three testing phases before the FDA will grant 
approval for commercial marketing and public access to a drug.5  For Abigail, the 
process proved too long.6   This policy denied her the experimental drug, Erbitux, a 
cancer-fighting drug that Abigail’s oncologist believed had a significant chance of 
saving her life.7  Despite her doctor’s dedication and her family’s continuing support, 
Abigail died in 2001—just two years after being diagnosed with the fast-moving 
cancer.8  
Following Abigail’s death, her father, Frank Burroughs, founded the Abigail 
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail Alliance)9 which has 
dedicated itself to removing the “regulatory barriers currently preventing seriously ill 
patients from gaining access” to potentially life-saving drugs.10  Toward that end, the 
Abigail Alliance filed suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the FDA Commissioner, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the 
ban on Phase I experimental drugs11 that have been “deemed sufficiently safe for 
substantial human testing, but [have] not yet proven to be safe and effective [for 
commercial marketing].”12 
On August 30, 2007, the D.C. Circuit dealt the Abigail Alliance a harsh blow 
when it held in Abigail v. von Eschenbach that terminally ill patients, such as 
Abigail, have no constitutional right of access to drugs that have not been proven 
                                                          
1
 See Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families 
Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, in LIFE EXTENSION 26 (Special Ed. 2007), available 
at http://abigail-alliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf. 
2
 Id. at 26. 
3
 Id. at 26-28. 
4
 Id. at 26 
5
 See Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008); see also Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 
474 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
6
 See Kovach, supra note 1, at 26-27. 
7
 Id. at 26. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. at 25.  
11
 See Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473-474, rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
12
 See Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473, 486 (quoting FDA counsel’s oral arguments that 
“[i]t takes approximately one year to conduct Phase I testing”). 
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safe and effective by the FDA.13  Consequently, seriously ill patients seeking access 
to experimental drugs must either fit the FDA’s stringent qualifications for 
experimental trials or wait for the drug to make its way through the FDA’s 
burdensome approval process.14  For people, like Abigail, who are denied 
participation in experimental studies,15  the typical seven-year wait will end in a 
death made all the more bitter by the knowledge that the FDA withheld access to 
potentially life-saving medications.16  That the FDA eventually approved the very 
experimental drug Abigail sought to save her life must have been bitter medicine for 
her friends and family.17  
This paper will argue that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abigail rested on faulty 
conclusions.  Specifically, the Abigail court’s cursory examination of the history of 
drug18 regulation in the United States resulted in a mischaracterization of our 
nation’s traditional attitude toward individual access to medicines.  A close 
examination of the history of pharmacology in this country reveals the true 
tradition—a society accustomed to self-medicating and which implicitly assumed the 
government could not interfere with its personal choice to take certain medications.19 
Section II of this paper examines the holding in Abigail with reference to 
Washington v. Glucksberg,20 which set out the test for determining whether a 
                                                                
13
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.   The Abigail court also rejected the Abigail 
Alliance’s arguments that application of the FDA policies is an intentional tort because it 
prevents a third party from rendering necessary aid to terminally ill patients and furthermore 
ruled that the common law doctrines of necessity and self-defense do not support the Abigail 
Alliance’s claim of a fundamental right of access.  Id.  
14
 See Kovach, supra note 1, at 27.   
15
 Sue Kovach writes that although the FDA was testing the efficacy of Erbitux in battling 
the type of cancer cells invading Abigail’s body, the FDA denied her access to the 
experimental trials because those trials were designed to treat colon cancer.  See Kovach, 
supra note 1, at 27.  Because Abigail’s cancer was located in her head and neck, the FDA 
considered her case irrelevant to the study.  Id. 
16
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 698 (noting that the “testing process is an extremely 
lengthy one, requiring nearly seven years for the average experimental drug”). 
17
 See Andrew Pollack, Court Rejects Patient Right to Use Drugs Being Tested, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A12.  
18
 The 1828 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines 
“drug” as “[t]he general name of substances used in medicine, sold by the druggist, and 
compounded by apothecaries and physicians; any substance, vegetable, animal or mineral, 
which is used in the composition or preparation of medicines.”  Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, 
CORNERSTONE BAPTIST TEMPLE, http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/webster1828.htm (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
19
 See infra Part III. 
20
 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).  The Supreme Court in 
Glucksberg stated the test thusly:  
“Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: 
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed . . . . [s]econd, we have required 
56 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 21:53 
particular liberty interest is fundamental.  Section III reveals the long-held American 
tradition of self-medication.  Section IV surveys the American history of drug 
regulation and analyzes the text of several state and federal laws the Abigail court 
cited to support its holding.  Section V proposes that application of the Glucksberg 
test to this country’s long tradition of self-medication regulation renders the 
conclusion that there is in the United States a fundamental right of access to 
experimental drugs.  Finally, Section VI concludes that courts should recognize the 
Abigail Alliance’s fundamental right of access to experimental drugs. 
II.  ABIGAIL ALLIANCE V. VON ESCHENBACH 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes the government from 
depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”21  The 
Supreme Court has held that these rights warrant “heightened protection against 
governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”22  
Therefore, if the government impinges on fundamental rights, such as privacy, 
marriage, abortion, or bodily integrity, its action must be necessary to fulfill some 
compelling governmental interest.23  
In Abigail, the D.C. Circuit held that terminally ill patients do not have a 
fundamental right of access to potentially life-saving drugs that have not been fully 
approved by the FDA.24  The Abigail court relied heavily on Washington v. 
Glucksberg, which held that a right is fundamental under the due process clause if it 
is “objectively, deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition…and implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.”25  The Abigail court concluded that there is no 
tradition in the United States to support a right of access to drugs that have not been 
proven safe.26  Instead, the court stated that this country has a long history of drug 
regulation aimed at preventing access to unsafe drugs.27  Accordingly, the court 
                                                          
in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted fundamental 
interest.”   
Id. at 720-21.  
21
 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
22
 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
23
 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 
251 (1891) (concluding that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by 
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law”). 
24
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.    
25
 Glucksberg, 117 U.S. at 720-721 (1997).  The Glucksberg test requires a showing that a 
liberty interest is deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions, but also that the interest 
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
it were sacrificed.”  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.  The Abigail court, however, did not reach 
the second prong because it concluded that the Abigail Alliance had failed to show their 
interest was deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.  See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 
at 697. 
26
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703. 
27
 Id.  
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subjected FDA regulations prohibiting access to experimental drugs to the relatively 
undemanding test of rational basis scrutiny.28  The court then concluded that FDA 
regulations limiting access to experimental drugs are rationally related to the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting the public from potentially unsafe drugs whose 
efficacy has not been established.29  Had the Abigail court determined that terminally 
ill patients have a fundamental right of access to potentially life-saving experimental 
drugs, it would have then subjected the FDA policies at issue to strict scrutiny, a 
much higher constitutional standard.30   
To support its conclusions, the Abigail court offered a history of drug safety 
regulation dating back to 1736 and professed the existence of a long history of drug 
regulation in England.31  The court’s treatment of the history, however, was cursory 
and resulted in premature assumptions based on a mischaracterization of the laws it 
blithely cited.  The court failed to consider the vast historical material which reveals 
the real tradition in this country: the individual’s unfettered choice to ingest drugs, 
even those not proven safe for human consumption.32  The true American tradition is 
one of self-medication, not government regulation.33 
III.  THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF SELF-MEDICATION 
A.  Self-Medication in Early America 
For centuries, Americans enjoyed the right to decide how to cure themselves—a 
tradition inherited from English culture.34  American colonists treasured their 
medical self-help books and brought from their mother country the custom of self-
medication.35  As early as 1613, books, such as The English Housewife and the 
English Husbandman, guided colonists in cultivating and administering medicinal 
herbs and drugs.36  More than a century later, John Tenant of Virginia published 
Everyman His Own Doctor (1734), which was translated into German and used by 
common farmers throughout Pennsylvania Dutch.37 
Medicinal decoctions were often administered by the earliest medical 
practitioners in colonial America—British housewives.38  This American tradition is 
                                                                
28
 Id. at 712-13.  
29
 Id. at 713.  
30
 Id. at 711. 
31
 Id. at 704-06.  
32
 See infra Part III. 
33
 See infra Parts III and IV. 
34
 See EDWARD KREMERS & GEORGE URDANG, KREMERS AND URDANG’S HISTORY OF 
PHARMACY 153 (Glenn Sonnedecker ed., J.B. Lippincott) (4th ed. 1976). 
35
 Id. at 153. 
36
 Id. 
37
 See DAVID L. COWEN,  PHARMACOPOEIAS AND RELATED LITERATURE IN BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA, 1618-1847 at 269 (Ashgate 2001). 
38
 See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 153. 
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reflected in Nicolas Culpeper’s The English Physician, a book published in 1652 as a 
“Discourse of the Vulgar Herbs of this Nation; Containing a Compleat [sic] Method 
of Physick [sic].  Whereby a man may preserve his body in Health, or Cure Himself, 
being Sick, for three pence Charge with such things only as grow in England, they 
being most fit for English bodies.”39 
The English settlers took advantage of their opportunity to experiment in their 
New World, a land that rendered new and diverse flora with immense curative 
potential.40  Colonists learned to grow plants and indigenous herbs, and experimented 
with treatments learned from Native Americans41 despite repeated admonitions from 
medical doctors, who warned against the dangers of unknown therapies.42  For 
example, in his Centennial Address to the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1881, 
Dr. Samuel Abbott Green warned colleagues about the medical treatments colonists 
sought from Native Americans:   
The Indians had no knowledge of medicine, but were accustomed to treat 
disease largely by incantations and powwows.  There is, however, a 
popular belief to-day that the Indian doctor is skilled in botanical 
remedies, as he is wont to use the infusions and decoctions of various 
roots and herbs.  While there is no ground for such an impression, he will 
yet be consulted as long as the race of simpletons continues to exist—
perhaps to the millennium.  The ravages of small-pox among the ignorant 
natives were fearful, as they had no knowledge of inoculation or 
vaccination; and thus a new danger opposed the white settlers, who were 
already overburdened by their cares and trials.43   
                                                                
39
 Quoted in George E. Osborne, Pharmacy in British Colonial America, in AMERICAN 
PHARMACY IN THE COLONIAL REVOLUTIONARY PERIODS: A BICENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM 
SPONSORED BY THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THE HISTORY OF PHARMACY WITH THE CO-
SPONSORSHIP OF THE AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY 
OF HOSPITAL PHARMACISTS, NEW ORLEANS, APRIL, 1976 at 8 (George A. Bender and John 
Parascandola, eds., American Inst. of the History of Pharmacy 1977). 
40
 See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 146-47. 
41
 Colonists’ use of Native American drugs was extensive.  See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, 
NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 26-33 
(Johns Hopkins 1997).  In fact, about 170 drugs used by Native Americans in North and South 
America were included in the United States Pharmacopoeia or the National Formulary.  See 
KREMERS, supra note 34, at 147.  These two sources became the official standard used under 
the Federal Food and Drug Administration Act passed in 1906.  See Glenn Sonnedecker, Drug 
Standards Become Official, in THE EARLY YEARS OF FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG CONTROL 28-
30 (Glenn Sonnedecker ed., Am. Inst. of the History of Pharmacy 1982).    
42
 See SAMUEL ABBOTT GREEN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CENTENNIAL 
ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL SOCIETY AT CAMBRIDGE 13 (A. 
Williams and Co. 1881).  Native Americans employed extensive knowledge of the healing 
properties of plants.  They used leaves, roots, and bark to develop powerful remedies, many of 
which colonists consumed without ever discovering the secret to their curative powers.  See 
CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 26-27.   
43
 GREEN, supra note 42, at 13 (emphasis added). 
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Dr. Green’s words reflect Americans’ faith in Native American medicine and the 
great extent to which early settlers relied on Native American treatments, despite 
medical officials’ recriminations against such practices.  That Dr. Green delivered 
this speech to the Massachusetts Medical society suggests that the medical 
establishment viewed Indian medicine as little more than attempts to heal by 
ceremony, incantation, and magic.   
There seems to have been no consensus on this point among medical 
professionals.  In colonial Virginia, for example, many English physicians and 
apothecaries dispatched their apprentices into the woods in search of herbal 
remedies.44  Furthermore, the above excerpt reflects a determination among medical 
professionals to maintain their preeminence as doctors among a community of 
Americans accustomed to exercise what they had come to view as their right to self-
medication.45   
Nevertheless, colonists’ use of Native American drugs was extensive.46  Many 
colonists, in fact, had great faith in the Native Americans’ extensive knowledge of 
the healing properties of plants, and they consumed drugs47 that Indian doctors 
decocted from leaves, roots, and bark, often without ever discovering the curative 
powers of these drugs.48  Caught between official recriminations, such as those by 
Dr. Green,49 and convictions held by those doctors who sought to replicate Indian 
remedies, many colonists chose to relieve their ills with Indian drugs, even though 
they often knew nothing about the nature of such medicines.50  That government did 
not interfere with such decisions reflects how English tradition, the New World 
experience, and frontier living all combined to strengthen the American tradition of 
self-medication.51 
The strength of this tradition, coupled with an increase in population, created a 
boom in the number of apothecary shops and drugstores that sold drugs to colonists 
                                                                
44
 See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 30-31. 
45
 See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 159 (positing that London physicians sought to curb the 
ambitions of apothecaries, who also dispensed drugs to the public); see also text infra 
accompanying notes 80-83.   
46
 See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 30-31. 
47
 Although native treatments were decocted from plants, they were nonetheless drugs.  In 
fact, the House Report on the Import Drug Act of 1848 specifically refers to plant derivatives 
as drugs.  See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664.  The Report refers to columbo and gentian roots as 
“important crude drugs” and enumerates plant derivatives, such as rhubarb root, jalap root, and 
sarsaparilla root, under the rubric of “some of the more important drugs.”  Id. at 4, 9.  
According to the report, Jalap root and Peruvian bark were “capital” medicines.  Id. at 32, 29.  
Peruvian bark was used for quinine, which became an important drug for soldiers fighting in 
such wars as the American Revolution.  See George B. Griffenhagen, Medicines in the 
American Revolution, in AMERICAN PHARMACY IN THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIODS 27 (George A. Bender & John Parascandola ed., American Institute of the History of 
Pharm. 1976).   
48
 See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 26-27.   
49
 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 13. 
50
 See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 26-27.   
51
 See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 213. 
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over the counter.52  The increase led Dr. William Douglass to remark in 1722 that 
“[w]e abound with Practitioners, though no other graduate than myself, we have 
fourteen Apothecary shops in Boston; all our Practitioners dispense their own 
medicines.”53  Whether run by physicians, pharmacists, apothecaries, or self-
described purveyors of good health, these shops and drugstores dispensed myriad 
drugs, chemicals, and medicines directly to eager colonists.54  In fact, in 1729 the 
revered Benjamin Franklin advertised in his Pennsylvania Gazette that his own store 
offered “powdered mustard, linseed oil, patent medicines and ‘seneca rattlesnake 
root, with directions how to use it in pleurisy.’”55  Like many drug dispensers, it is 
unlikely that Franklin sold his wares by prescription to a community of colonists 
accustomed to self-medicating.56 
B.  The Patent Medicine Boom 
In the 1750s, English patent medicines57 appeared in the colonies, and colonists 
began to dose themselves with large quantities of these “secret” medicines.58  
According to James Harvey Young, “Americans dosed themselves with galenicals 
and chymicals [sic], and swallowed complicated concoctions containing disgusting 
ingredients, in their efforts to drive away the ills” that afflicted them.59  Known as 
“secret remedies” since the sixteenth century, patent medicines were concocted by 
anyone with a quest for knowledge and a bit of motivation.60  Because the ingredients 
were secret, the patents issued covered only the shape of the bottles—not the 
contents,61 a policy that makes sense given that nobody really knew what was in 
                                                                
52
 Id. at 155-57.  
53
 Id. at 156.   
54
 Id. at 157. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 English patent medicines date back to the 1630s.  The patent was a royal endowment 
given to makers of medicinal remedies that had become popular for their healing properties.  
Typically concocted from a multitude of unknown ingredients, patent medicines were 
marketed as cures for a wide variety of ailments.  Eventually, the term “patent medicine” came 
to refer to any secret nostrum (patented or not) marketed as miracle remedies.  See generally 
GEORGE B. GRIFFENHAGEN & JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, Old English Patent Medicines in 
America, in CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE MUSEUM OF HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY, PAPERS 1-11, 
155 (Ernest E. Biebighauser ed., Smithsonian 1959). 
58
 See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 9, 67 (Princeton Univ. Press. 
1961). 
59
 Id. at 8. 
60
 See Michael H. Jepson, From Secret Remedies to Prescription Medicines: A Brief 
History of Medicine, in MAKING MEDICINES: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PHARMACY AND 
PHARMACEUTICALS 224-26 (Stuart Anderson ed., Pharmaceutical Press 2005).  
61
 See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 40. 
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them.  Thus, although the “ingredients might vary…,” the bottles were all shaped the 
same.62  
Countless advertisements testify to the wide acceptance and use of such 
medicines in American history.63  By the time of the American Revolution, 
Americans had grown dependent on English patent medicines.64  Because of non-
importation policies during the war, English patent medicines had grown scarce, and 
Americans turned toward domestic production, which later boomed during the Civil 
War.65  Americans replicated the English brands and packaged them inside the 
English bottles to give them the appearance of authenticity.66  Although American 
patent medicines contained any number of ingredients, American consumers 
continued to purchase the “English” patent medicines because they recognized the 
bottles of their favorite brands.67  In fact, the ability to market the medicines seems to 
have depended solely on the availability of authentic English bottles.68  In short, it 
appears Americans continued to buy medicines concocted by their enterprising 
fellow citizens merely because they had grown to trust the bottles, not the 
ingredients. 
The popularity of English patent medicines decreased dramatically by the end of 
the American Revolution.69  This shift was not, however, due to Americans’ distaste 
for such medicines, but occurred because the domestic patent medicine industry had 
grown during the war and eventually supplanted its English antecedent.70  The 
American patent medicine industry was then poised to reap huge potential benefits 
presented by a domestic market.   
                                                                
62
 Id. at 12. 
63
 James Harvey Young states:  
Quackery was flagrant and brazen.  No disease, however dire, if one believed 
advertising, could resist the potency of the promoter’s product.  Harper’s Weekly 
possessed for its day a very large circulation and was considered one of the best 
advertising media in the nation.  In leafing through the volume for 1876, the nation’s 
centennial year, I found in this most respectable publication promises for the certain 
cure of asthma, cancer, cholera, consumption, diabetes, diphtheria, epilepsy, 
rheumatism, gout, nervous ailments, and opium addiction.  Although Harper’s Weekly 
was too genteel to accept abortifacient advertisements or promises to restore the 
prolapsed uterus or explicit cures for venereal disease and lost manhood, these bold 
claims could be found in other standard journals, including the religious press.  In 
1900 patent medicines stood as top category in money spent for national advertising. 
JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, AMERICAN HEALTH QUACKERY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 91-92 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 1992). 
64
 See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 14. 
65
 Id. at 14-15, 93-110. 
66
 Id. at 14-15.   
67
 Id. at 14-15.    
68
 Id. at 14-15.   
69
 Id. at 15.   
70
 Id. 
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During the Civil War era, the domestic patent medicine industry grew to 
extraordinary heights.71  Furthermore, Congress seemingly recognized the American 
culture of self-medication when in 1861 it taxed patent medicines for the purpose of 
raising revenue for the impending war.72  By 1905, one estimate put the number of 
patented medicines manufactured and sold in the U.S. at 28,000; the following year, 
a witness before Congress estimated that there were then 50,000.73 
Despite their immense popularity, patent medicines came under attack by 
American doctors.74  In 1827, New York City created a “Committee of Quack 
Remedies” to condemn the practice of quackery,75 and the following year a New 
York State medical society adopted its official opposition to patent medicines 
because it considered such medications anathema to the practice of medicine.76  Yet 
the doctors did not rail against the manufacturing and sale of patent medicines in 
general but against their sale and use by non-physicians.77  In fact, the New York 
City committee feared that allowing medical pretenders to sell patent medicines 
would lead to the degradation of the medical profession.78  Referring to what it called 
“pretending empiric[s]” who sold such medicines, the committee report stated that 
“their partial successes will confer upon their order, an importance and character 
that could not be otherwise obtained, to the serious detriment of the healing art.”79  
Thus, it appears that the committee physicians, like those who fulminated against the 
use of Indian drugs, feared both the failures and the successes that resulted from the 
use of patent medicines.  
Like doctors who had railed against the use of Native American drugs, physicians 
across the country admonished Americans against the use of patent medicines and 
                                                                
71
 Id. at 93-110.   
72
 Id. at 107.  
73
 Id. at 109.  
74
 Id. at 63-67.   
75
 The 1828 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines 
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pushed for legislation to ban their sale.80  They often warned Americans that buying 
medicines from unlicensed professionals was like employing “a blacksmith to repair 
a watch, a barber to shoe a horse, a ship-carpenter to make bonnets, or a milliner to 
build a church.”81  Meanwhile, others accused Congress of licensing the sale of 
patent medicines.82  Such legislative inaction, one doctor said in 1849, allowed 
deceitful men to prey on the American public.83  Yet despite the efforts made by the 
medical establishment, Congress did nothing to regulate the inherent safety of drugs 
until well into the twentieth century.84 
Very real dangers certainly attended the consumption of patent medicines 
generally.85   For example, a patent medicine caused the death of a young girl in 
1805.86  In addition, patent medicines often merely offered false and fleeting hope to 
patients who experienced temporary relief from those containing pain-numbing 
opiates.87  Nonetheless, Americans eagerly consumed patent medicines containing 
such narcotics. 
C.  Americans and “Illicit” Drugs 
Patent medicines containing opium were readily available.  Sold under such 
innocuous names as “Mrs. Winslow’s Soothing Syrup” and “McMunn’s Elixir of 
Opium,” these drugs were widely marketed as treatments for dysentery, diarrhea, and 
“women’s trouble.”88  Moreover, Americans considered opiate patent medicines so 
versatile that many mothers even used them to quiet teething babies.89  In fact, patent 
medicine advertisements, which became ubiquitous,90 proclaimed that these 
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medicines could cure anything from anxiety to marital problems.91  Ultimately, 
however, these medicines were a legal supply of a narcotic which was readily 
accessible at the cost of a bottled concoction.92   
Patent medicines were not the sole legal source of opium.93  By 1800, opium had 
become widely available in the U.S. and was a common ingredient even in 
prescription drugs.94  Many doctors extolled the soothing, sedative effects of opium, 
which most doctors believed outweighed any potential harmful effects.95  In fact, 
many physicians referred to opium as “G.O.M.”—“god’s own medicine”—not only 
because they allowed the patient to sleep during surgery96 but also because it could 
be decocted into morphine and heroin—potent painkillers that could be used for a 
range of illnesses and ailments.97 
Morphine gained avid support among Americans after it was derived from opium 
in 1804.98  Legally manufactured in the United States, morphine became a common 
ingredient in patent medicines, and its use soared during the 1870s.  This marked 
increase in morphine use was due in great part to the invention of the hypodermic 
needle which greatly facilitated its consumption.99  The proliferation of patent 
medicines and the wide acceptance of morphine to treat soldiers in the Civil War 
also added substantially to the drug’s popularity.  In 1874, heroin was decocted from 
morphine and was eventually sold as “The Sedative for Coughs” by Bayer 
Pharmaceuticals in 1898.100  Ironically, doctors prescribed heroin to wean morphine 
addicts off the drug, but they also used heroin to treat the great number of patients 
who suffered from pulmonary disorders, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis.101  
Cocaine, too, became a common ingredient in patent medicines.102  First derived 
from the coca plant in 1844, cocaine became a common beverage ingredient 
throughout Europe and North America, the most recognizable of which was Coca-
Cola.  Many Americans consumed the drug to alleviate depression, treat morphine 
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addiction, or merely to stimulate themselves.103  Endorsed by the Surgeon-General of 
the U.S. Army for its medical properties, cocaine gained great popularity at the turn 
of the twentieth century when it became a common ingredient in tonics marketed to 
treat various respiratory illnesses and to overcome exhaustion and fatigue.104  
Altogether, Americans liberally consumed opiates, cocaine, and marijuana through 
the beginning of the twentieth century, and through the 1920s, doctors continued to 
prescribe heroin extensively.105 
Despite their popularity, opiates, cocaine, and marijuana did not gain complete 
social or medical acceptance.106  Opiates in particular were not considered 
respectable and in some cases their use was thought immoral.107  Many civic and 
religious leaders joined doctors to warn Americans of their potentially harmful 
effects.108  Together, they preached moderation or espoused government control.109  
Yet despite warnings about the drugs’ potentially harmful effects and their powerful 
addictive properties, there was scarcely any popular support for banning or even 
regulating them.110  Indeed, Americans legally engaged in large-scale, non-prescribed 
cannabis, cocaine and opium consumption well into the twentieth century.111 
Like Native American drugs and patent medicines in general, opiates came under 
fire from those warning of the dangers they posed to human health.112  Yet 
Americans continued to use drugs from all these classes.113  The strength of this 
continued tradition lay in the potent contemporary institution of American 
individualism, an institution summarized by a New York doctor, who in 1856 
lamented but accurately described the popular understanding of the time, stating, 
“The people regard it among their vested interests…to buy and swallow such 
physick [sic] as they in their sovereign will and pleasure shall determine; and in this 
free country, the democracy denounce all restrictions [on self-medication].”114  This 
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sentiment was echoed with passion by a New York Senator who, reacting 
sympathetically to a wheelbarrow full of signatures written on a petition115 that 
extended thirty-one yards, declared that “[t]he people of this state have been bled 
long enough in their bodies and pockets…and it [is] time they should do as the men 
of the Revolution did: resolve to set down and enjoy the freedom for which they 
bled.”116  In short, it seems Americans had come to view the democratization 
embodied in the Spirit of ’76 as encompassing individual personal choices.  Among 
such choices was the right to self-medication. 
Although the government has rightly prohibited the use of certain drugs deemed 
harmful to health and society, our nation’s history of marijuana, cocaine, and 
narcotics consumption epitomizes the American tradition of self-medication.  For 
much of the nineteenth century, physicians, pharmacies, drugstores, groceries, and 
general stores all sold opiates legally and conveniently.117  Many Americans even 
bought opiates by mail-order,118 a testament to the permissive government attitude 
toward drug regulation.  Until well into the twentieth century, self-indulgent 
Americans dosed themselves on these drugs119 just as much as they did on 
compounded medicines that were dispensed freely and sold to eager Americans.120    
To be sure, the government’s historically permissive approach to such drugs does 
not suggest that it should recognize Americans’ absolute right to ingest them.  
However, its laissez-faire approach does indicate that government has long 
recognized and accepted the citizenry’s choice in ingesting drugs generally. 
IV.  THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE DRUG REGULATION 
A.  Consumer Protection in Early America 
Government’s laissez-faire approach to drug regulation further testifies to the 
American tradition of self-medication, despite that the American tradition of self-
medication certainly bred countless pseudo-healers.121  An Ohio editor lamented the 
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ease with which Americans could make such concoctions in the mid-nineteenth 
century.122  He described how the average person could easily get into the business of 
selling drugs:  
[A]ny idle mechanic by chance gets a dispensatory, or some old receipt 
book, and poring over it, or having it read to him…, he finds that mercury 
is good for the itch, and old ulsers [sic]; that opium will give ease; and 
that a glass of antimony will vomit.  Down goes the hammer, or saw, 
razor, awl, or shutter—and away to make electuaries, tinctures, elixirs, 
pills, plasters and poultices.123   
Yet government generally did little, if anything, to ensure that citizens would not 
be harmed by unsafe or ineffective medicines.124 
Before 1865, free competition and the honor system regulated drug safety.125  
Early British settlers and nineteenth-century Americans believed the pharmaceutical 
profession bore the sole responsibility for ensuring the purity of drugs.126  According 
to FDA historian Wallace F. Janssen, the enormous popularity of patent medicines 
reflected contemporary “public acceptance of the doctrine that the buyer could and 
should look out for himself.”127  This view likely sprung directly from the economic 
climate of the day, which emphasized laissez-faire capitalism and individualism.128  
Such opposition to drug legislation may be gleaned from the words of a Georgia 
Congressman, who drolly remarked that “[t]he Federal Government was not created 
for the purpose of cutting your toe nails or corns.”129  While whimsical, his words 
reflect the popular sentiment that consumers would be protected by economic 
competition and freedom of enterprise, not by the intervention of government 
regulation.   
Comprehensive legislation governing specific pharmaceutical activities did not 
become common in the United States until after 1870.130  Before then, American 
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ideology borne of democratic and laissez-faire economic principles combined with 
frontier living to preempt the development of comprehensive drug regulation.131  The 
United States does, however, have a long history of drug regulation aimed at 
protecting consumers from fraud or misrepresentation.132  Such regulations were 
intended to regulate the efficacy of drugs in order to ensure that unsuspecting 
Americans did not purchase drugs that came with false assurances.133  In fact, most 
colonial regulation involved the structuring of fees,134 not denial of access to 
potentially unsafe drugs.135  In brief, most laws were designed to prevent quackery 
and the exorbitant fees136 associated with that dubious though lucrative vocation.137   
This American tradition of protecting consumer confidence dates back to 1630 
when Massachusetts Bay Colony authorities fined or whipped one Nicholas Knopp 
for “vending as a cure for scurvy ‘a water of no worth nor value,’ which he ‘solde att 
a very deare rate [sic].’”138  The Massachusetts authorities were concerned that 
purveyors of drugs were deceiving colonists into paying high prices for drugs of “no 
worth nor value.”139  As the Abigail court noted in a footnote, Knopp’s punishment 
was not an example of government regulation in the modern sense.140  Yet the court 
failed to recognize that the incident reflects the importance that early Americans 
placed on protecting the confidence and pocketbooks of consumers who sought to 
self-medicate—a tradition Americans would carry into the twentieth century.141  
Colonies, and later states, certainly have a history of regulating drugs, but such 
regulations reflect the community’s desire to condemn frauds, such as Knopp’s in 
Massachusetts.142  Rather than recognize that Knopp’s punishment reflected 
consumerist principles, the Abigail court cited the case to add flavor, credibility, and 
a sense of pedigree to what it viewed as a long-standing tradition of drug regulation 
in this country.  Drug regulation certainly extends as far back as 1630 when Knopp 
was made to pay for his deception, but it is not a tradition of regulating the safety of 
drugs.  History bears this out. 
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B.  State Regulations 
1.  The Virginia Act of 1736 
The Abigail court began its examination of history by stating that “[d]rug 
regulation in the United States began when the Colony of Virginia’s legislature 
passed an act in 1736 that addressed the dispensing of more drugs than was 
‘necessary or useful’ because that practice had become ‘dangerous and 
intolerable.’”143  These words certainly convey alarm, but such alarm could result 
only from a gross mischaracterization of the act, which in fact merely arranged a fee 
structure for the sale of drugs by surgeons and apothecaries.144    
The Abigail court cited the words “necessary and useful” out of context.145   The 
1736 statute reveals that the Virginia House of Burgesses merely sought to prevent 
surgeons and apothecaries from “padding” their bills.146  Rather than regulate drug 
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safety, the Burgesses were seeking to regulate pharmacy professionals who “for the 
sake of making up long and expensive bills, load their patients with greater quantities 
thereof, than are necessary and useful, concealing all their compositions, as well to 
prevent the discovery of their practice, as of the true value of what they 
administer.”147  More importantly, the words “dangerous and intolerable” referred 
only to the fact that this practice of padding had “become a grievance, dangerous 
and intolerable, as well to the poorer sort of people, and others”—their customers.148  
By citing each phrase out of context and binding them together, the Abigail court 
conveyed the false impression that the Virginia legislature designed the act to 
regulate the sale of dangerous drugs, when in fact it merely sought to prevent the 
practice by which surgeons and apothecaries “padded” their bills by prescribing 
superfluous drugs to unsuspecting consumers.149  
Rather than a law designed to protect patients by promoting the safety of drugs, 
the 1736 legislation was designed to protect consumers from having to pay excessive 
fees150 for the medicines they used in their self-medication regimes.151  Specifically, 
the law was created to ensure that those who had served only as apprentices would 
receive a lower rate of remuneration for their services,152 but its broader purpose was 
consumer protection.153  In effect, the Virginia Act protected the consumer by setting 
fees for practitioners according to their level of education and training.154  Although 
the law also provided that practitioners itemize all ingredients in the drugs they 
sold,155 it appears the provision was intended to ensure that consumers knew the 
potency of the drugs they were buying.  Whether or not to purchase particular drugs 
would have remained the consumer’s choice.   
The Virginia Act was not a mechanism to prohibit unlicensed persons from 
dispensing drugs.156   Indeed, the Act does not refer to licensing, but sets out a 
scheme by which educated dispensers could charge for their products.157  The law’s 
title, which the Abigail court omitted, was “An Act for regulating the Fees and 
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thence to end of the next session of assembly.   
Id. (emphases in the original unless otherwise stated) 
147
 BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399-400 (emphasis added). 
148
 Id. at 399-400 (emphases added).  
149
 See id. at 399 (stating that by passing the Virginia Act, the House of Burgesses “sought 
to remedy the abuses of excessive fees and ‘unreasonable prices’ for medicines”).  
150
 See BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399. 
151
 See supra Part III. 
152
 See BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399. 
153
 Id. 
154
 Id.; see also KREMERS, supra note 34, at 159 (stating that the act deprecated the 
abilities of apprentices). 
155
 See supra note 146. 
156
 Id.  
157
 Id. 
2008] DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG 71 
Accounts of the Practicers in Phisic [sic].”158  The title reflects the import of the law, 
which did not bar anyone not trained in pharmacy from continuing to concoct and 
dispense drugs in Virginia yet made it illegal for professionals to demand more than 
the value of their products.159  To be sure, average Virginians and their colonial 
brothers continued to enjoy their notoriety for their ability to treat illness.160  In short, 
although the Abigail court cited the Virginia Act as proof of government’s dedication 
to regulating drug safety,161 the 1736 law is better characterized as legislation 
designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous peddlers seeking to secure 
unreasonable fees for drugs.  As such, its citation lends little support to the court’s 
holding in Abigail.  Of note, the Virginia Act expired just two years after it was 
passed,162 and similar bills were defeated in 1748, 1761, and 1762.163 
2.  The New Orleans Act of 1808 
The Abigail court also relied on a law passed in the Territory of Orleans, 
Louisiana in 1808.164  The court noted that the law, known as the “New Orleans 
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 An Act Concerning Physicians, Surgeons and Apothecaries— 
BE it enacted . . . That no person shall presume to practice, in the Territory of Orleans, as 
physician, surgeon or apothecary, without first exhibiting satisfactory proof of his having 
qualified himself as such, by previous studies, which shall be made to appear by a diploma of 
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forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars, to the benefit of the hospital of the poor of 
New-Orleans. 
And it be further enacted, That no physician, surgeon or apothecary, shall sell, give, or in 
any way, directly or indirectly, part with any suspicious or dangerous remedy, but on 
application in writing of heads of families of good reputation.—And it shall be the duty of said 
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Act,” “require[d] a diploma and an examination before permitting pharmacists to 
dispense drugs.”165  More importantly, the New Orleans Act prohibited unlicensed 
practitioners from collecting fees,166 a provision which certainly would have 
dampened the spirits of charlatans looking to make easy money by selling fraudulent 
medicines.  Thus, on its face, the New Orleans Act supports the Abigail court’s 
conclusion that governmental regulation of drug safety is deeply rooted in American 
history and traditions.   
The New Orleans Act, however, did not grow from American culture and 
tradition but from its Franco-Spanish tradition.167  Louisiana did not become an 
American territory until 1804, just four years before the passage of the New Orleans 
Act.168  Eighteenth-century French and Spanish legal traditions influenced the early 
development of drug regulation in American Louisiana and the passing of the 1804 
New Orleans Act, 169 which world-renowned pharmacy historian David L. Cowen 
called “by far the outstanding enactment in the history of pharmaceutical 
legislation.”170 
Eighty years before the U.S. annexed Louisiana, French officials passed a law 
that mirrored the 1808 law.171   It is likely that the 1723 French law was a precursor 
                                                          
heads of families, in said application in writing, to state for what use said remedy is wanted, 
the day on which said remedy was delivered, and receive [sic] the name, the quality, and the 
quantity of said remedy.  Said application in writing shall be the only means of defence [sic] 
allowed to the seller, in case said remedy should have been made use of with evil design; and 
should the seller prove unable to exhibit such a writing for his discharge, he shall be deprived 
of the exercise of his profession, and shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars, to 
the benefit of the hospital of New-Orleans. 
ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SECOND LEGISLATURE OF THE TERRITORY OF 
ORLEANS (New Orleans, 1808), at 24-31, quoted in David L. Cowen, America’s First 
Pharmacy Laws, 3 J. OF THE AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOC. 162-63 (1942). 
165
 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. 
166
 See RUDOLPH MATAS, HISTORY OF MEDICINE IN LOUISIANA 332 (John Duffy ed., La. 
State Univ. 1958). 
167
 Id. at 64.  From the days of early settlement, French officials engaged in “zealous 
supervision” of drugs, hospital facilities, and medical personnel, an enthusiasm reflected in 
French Louisiana laws.  Id. 
168
 Id. at xv-xvi.  The area that is today Louisiana had been a French territory from 1699 to 
1768, and had been a Spanish colony from 1769 to 1803.  Id. 
169
 See id. at 330 (stating that “the long tradition of regulation under the French and 
Spanish governments was bound to have had considerable influence” in early American 
attempts to regulate medicine in Louisiana); but see Cowen, supra note 164, at 219 
(cautioning against assuming that Louisiana’s preeminence in the field for medical regulation 
should be ascribed to its Franco-Spanish tradition, because “at least ten of the twenty-six 
individuals associated with drug shops in 1822 New Orleans had last names that were not of 
French or Spanish origin,” and there is evidence that in the early 1800s “the medical 
profession in Louisiana was rather disreputable”). 
170
 In Memoriam, DAVID L. COWEN, MEDICAL HISTORY SOCIETY OF NEW JERSEY, 
http://www.mhsnj.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007); see also David L. Cowen, Louisiana, 
Pioneer in the Regulation of Pharmacy, in LA. HIST. QUART.  331 (1943). 
171
 See MATAS, supra note 166, at 64.  In 1723, Louisiana’s Superior Council became 
alarmed that “several ignorant persons were giving remedies and performing operations in 
2008] DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG 73 
of the 1808 New Orleans Act, because the “relatively strong controls which French 
authorities had established over medical practice during the first half of the 
eighteenth century were continued and strengthened under the Spanish regime.”172  
Louisiana also boasts what is likely the earliest American law designed to regulate 
drug quality.173  The law was the prototype of the New Orleans Act,174 but was only 
one of many Spanish laws that reflected a strong Spanish commitment to the 
regulation of drugs.175  It is no wonder that in the area of drug regulation, Louisiana 
was far ahead of every other American state at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.176  
Louisiana’s preeminence in this field would not last long under American rule.  
In 1816, the state passed a law repealing the New Orleans Act and made no new 
provision to prohibit the sale of drugs.177  According to John Duffy, “[n]either the 
apothecaries nor the public apparently favored any such regulations, and a wide field 
was opened for unethical and unscrupulous individuals to profit at the expense of the 
sick.”178  In 1820, the American tradition of self-medication made its way into 
Louisiana law when the legislature permitted unlicensed persons to sell “medicines 
which shall have been purchased from any legal apothecary, and which have been 
plainly labeled by said apothecary.”179  While this law certainly regulated drugs, it 
did so by requiring that they be labeled,180 a tactic that would have made it easier for 
the average citizen to choose his preferred medication. 
By 1820, the American spirit of laissez-faire drug regulation had seemingly 
displaced the Franco-Spanish traditions, but the devolvement was not then 
complete.181  The most telling evidence of this shift in traditions is that in 1852 
Louisiana succumbed to the American tradition and finally repealed all medical 
                                                          
New Orleans as well as the country.”  Id. at 64.  The council responded by declaring that 
unlicensed practitioners were “forbidden to meddle in the arts of medicine or surgery on 
penalty of being prosecuted by the Attorney General and punished with death.”  Id. 
172
 Id. at 173. 
173
 Cowen, supra note 170, at 331.   Promulgated February 12, 1770 by Don Alexandre 
O’Reilly, Louisiana’s Spanish governor, the edict declared that, “[s]urgeons shall be always 
ready to open and show to the physician the place where they keep their remedies so that they 
may be inspected and thrown out if they are bad.”  Id.  The decree also forbade quackery by 
providing that “[a]ll pretended healers, who are not provided with documents and certificates, 
will be punished with imprisonment and arbitrary punishment if they are caught abusing the 
credulity of the people.”  MATAS, supra note 166, at 178.   
174
 MATAS, supra note 166, at 178.    
175
 Id. at 186-92. 
176
 Cowen, supra note 170, at 330.  
177
 John Duffy, Pharmacy in Franco-Spanish America, in AMER. PHARMACY IN THE 
COLONIAL AND REVOL. PERIODS 15, 24-25 (George A. Bender & John Parascandola ed., Amer. 
Inst. of the History of Pharm., 1976). 
178
 See MATAS, supra note 163, at 342. 
179
 See Cowen, supra note 167, at 334.  
180
 Id. 
181
 See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 214. 
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legislation.182  According to Cowen, this devolution demonstrated “Louisiana’s 
assimilation of the culture pattern of the rest of the country…[f]or the repeal of the 
legislation in 1852 came not from conditions peculiar to Louisiana, but from 
conditions characteristic of the entire American scene.”183  If anything, the 1808 New 
Orleans Act marked the highpoint of the Franco-Spanish tradition and does not 
accurately reflect the American tradition of drug regulation.  The Abigail court’s 
reference to the law therefore misrepresented the historical reality that the New 
Orleans Act reflected Franco-Spanish traditions, not laissez-faire American attitudes. 
3.  A Short Survey of State Regulations 
Although by 1870 many American states and territories had passed drug 
regulations, it does not necessarily follow that such regulations were designed to 
ensure drug safety.  The 1736 Virginia Act is merely an example of the various laws 
states passed to regulate the profession of pharmacy itself, not the access to unsafe 
drugs.184  Meanwhile, the historical context surrounding the New Orleans Act 
illustrates the American tradition of self-medication, as well as the government’s 
accommodation of those who sold drugs without licenses.185  To be sure, the 
                                                                
182
 Id. 
183
 Cowen, supra note 170, at 339.  
184
 The Virginia Act “reflects the attitude of London physicians of this period toward the 
medical ambitions of the apothecaries.”  KREMERS, supra note 34, at 159.  The law grew from 
a territorial dispute in which physicians sought to maintain status by differentiating themselves 
from the growing number of apothecaries, who had limited education but who were 
nonetheless permitted to dispense drugs.  The “Act for regulating fees and accounts” 
recognized the relative importance of the different professions by stamping each with specific 
rates associated with their differing levels of education.  Id.   
185
 The Abigail court noted that in 1817 South Carolina introduced legislation requiring 
the licensing of pharmacists.  See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.  To be sure, South 
Carolina was the first of the American colonies to require pharmacists to pass examinations 
(1818) and to require apothecaries to obtain their licenses by applying to the state’s medical 
society or board of physicians.  See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 184.  The 1817 Act contained 
a fatal flaw, however, at least from the point of view of those who assumed that the act was 
designed to eliminate the sale of medicines by non-professionals.  It declared “[t]hat nothing 
herein contained, be construed to prevent merchants or shop-keepers from vending or 
exposing to sale medicines already prepared.”  Cowen, supra note 164, at 166.  Thus, while 
the South Carolina law required examinations and licensing of pharmacists and apothecaries, 
it did not preclude the common man from entering a shop and choosing the medication he felt 
was necessary to cure his ailments.  In fact, the South Carolina legislation was intended to 
regulate the practice of medicine, not to curb the availability of drugs to the common man.   
Moreover, twenty years later, this legislation was further emasculated.  In 1838, South 
Carolina repealed all of the penalty provisions relating to both pharmacists and apothecaries—
which essentially eviscerated the entire legislation.  Id.  In 1825, Georgia passed a statute that 
closely tracked the language of the South Carolina Act passed in 1817.  Id. at 167.  Entitled, 
“An Act to regulate licensing of Physicians to practice in this state,” the act permitted 
physicians to sell drugs, required apothecaries to be licensed by the state, and prohibited 
“[m]erchants, shop keepers and all other persons from compounding and preparing drugs and 
medicines, or either.” Id.  It is clear then, that the Georgia Act was designed to prohibit the 
manufacture of drugs by anyone other than a licensed professional.  Eleven years later, 
however, Georgia repealed all of the penalty provisions of the 1825 act.  Id.  Although in 1839 
2008] DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG 75 
language of the various state acts must be read in context and their terms understood 
within the purposes of the various acts.   
The Abigail court failed to recognize this need to examine the particulars of each 
act.186  It stated that “[b]y 1870, at least twenty-five American states or territories had 
statutes regulating drug adulteration (impure drugs), and a few others had laws 
addressing poisons.”187  While this statement appears to support the court’s overall 
conclusion regarding drug safety regulation, it in fact reveals the court’s failure to 
recognize the intricacies and purposes of each of the twenty-five laws to which it 
referred.188  For example, when it defined “drug adulteration” as the fabrication of 
“impure drugs,” the Abigail court implied that the twenty-five states barred the 
production of inherently dangerous drugs.189  The word “impure” does not strictly 
mean dangerous, but it connotes danger, particularly when it is associated with the 
consumption of medications.190  As we shall see, the term “adulterated”191 as used in 
government drug regulations typically referred to drugs whose impurity has rendered 
them largely ineffective or inert, a quality that made them dangerous192 in that they 
                                                          
and 1847 the state declared the Georgia Act to be in full force, it did not also reinstate laws 
that prohibited the practice of Thompsonian medicine.  Id.  Thompsonian medicine was 
premised on the idea that every man could be his own physician. See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 
54. 
186
 For the purposes of this paper, an exhaustive examination of each statute cited by the 
court is not necessary.  The Virginia and New Orleans acts illustrate the Abigail court’s failure 
to examine closely the laws it cited to support its conclusion.  See supra Sections IV.B.1-2.  
Moreover, that the court’s facile construction of the word “adulterated” strongly implies 
danger demonstrates its failure to scrutinize the language of the various acts.  See infra Section 
IV.B.3.    
187
 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. 
188
 The Abigail court cited the work of Edward Kremers and George Urdang with regard 
to these twenty-five laws.  See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703-04; see also supra note 34.  
This author’s research into the sources used by Kremers and Urdang did not confirm the 
court’s assertion.   
189
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. 
190
 Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines “impure” as inter alia, “containing 
something unclean.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/impure (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
191
 The 1828 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines 
“adulterated” as “[c]orrupted; debased by a mixture with something of less value.”  Webster’s 
1828 Dictionary, CORNERSTONE BAPTIST TEMPLE, http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/ 
webster1828.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (emphasis added); Merriam-Webster’s 
contemporary online dictionary defines “adulterate” as “to corrupt, debase, or make impure by 
the addition of a foreign or inferior substance or element; especially : to prepare for sale by 
replacing more valuable with less valuable or inert ingredients.”  Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/adulterated (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (emphasis 
added).  Therefore, the term did not merely mean dangerously “impure,” but that which has 
been made less effective by corruption. 
192
 The danger associated with purchasing cheap drugs was that patients would forego 
more reliable medical treatment.  If the patient’s condition worsened while on the inadequate 
treatment, it might become too late to administer life-saving medical therapy.  See H.R. Rep. 
No. 30-664, at 20 (1848) (stating that physicians in the Mexican War administered “herculean 
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gave false hope to unsuspecting consumers who bought cheap, useless drugs from 
“quacks”193 in their efforts to self-medicate.   
In any event, “under the double impact of the growth of medical laissez-faire and 
of the Civil War,” state laws regulating access to drugs became dead letters on the 
books.194  In fact, a survey of state pharmaceutical laws found that by 1931, twenty-
three states had no restrictions on the sale of patent medicines by “general 
merchants”—that is, “anyone permitted to sell drugs and medicines who [was] not a 
registered pharmacist or assistant pharmacist.”195  Furthermore, only three states—
Colorado, Mississippi, and Nebraska—absolutely prohibited such sales.196  Given the 
relatively lax state regulations of pharmacy, it would be difficult to conclude, as the 
Abigail court seems to have done,197 that states maintained a strong commitment to 
regulating drug safety even by the time of the early twentieth century. 
C.  Federal Regulations 
It was not until 1938 that Congress passed any federal legislation regulating drug 
safety.198  The Abigail court, however, characterized three federal drug regulations as 
laws designed to prevent access to unsafe drugs—the Import Drug Act of 1848, the 
Biologics Controls Act of 1902, and the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.199  While 
the court accurately described the Biologics Control Act as a safety regulation, it 
failed to consider the purpose behind it, which was to ensure that vaccinations being 
forced on American citizens were in fact safe.200  Indeed, that act had little to do with 
personal choice.201  Meanwhile, the court failed to recognize the peculiar language of 
the Import Drug Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act, neither of which prohibited 
                                                          
portions of active medicines” of adulterated drugs purchased abroad).  That such large 
portions of drugs had to be administered demonstrates the danger of adulterated drugs.  The 
concern with such a danger as associated with fraud is evident in the variety of state laws 
dealing with drug adulteration.  For example, by 1858, Tennessee law penalized any 
adulteration of drugs that would render the drugs less effective and thus dangerous to health.  
In fact, various states prohibited fraudulent adulteration, which would render drugs harmful.  
In 1839 and 1844, Vermont and Rhode Island each respectively passed such prohibitions.  See 
Sonnedecker, supra note 125, at 97. 
193
 Worling, supra note 75, at 60. 
194
 KREMERS, supra note 34, at 215. 
195
 Id. 
196
 See Robert P. Fischelis, A Survey of State Pharmacy Laws with Reference to the Sale of 
Drugs and Medicines by General Merchants, in AM. PHARM. ASSOC. 1331, 1333-38 (Dec. 
1931).   
197
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. 
198
 See The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938); see also 
YOUNG, supra note 129, at 12. 
199
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.  
200
 See Henning Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that 
the state may exercise its police power to mandate forced vaccinations because they are part of 
a wholesome practice of ensuring the public welfare). 
201
 Id. 
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the sale of dangerous drugs.202  In fact, these two laws are better characterized as 
attempts to provide consumer information to those choosing medications for 
themselves.203  Any regulation of drug safety under these two laws seems to have 
been an incidental effect subordinated to the larger purpose of achieving greater 
economic reliability for consumers.204 
1.  The Import Drug Act of 1848 
In 1848, Congress passed the Import Drug Act.205  The Import Drug Act was the 
federal government’s first attempt to regulate drugs and was passed because by 1848 
the U.S. had become a virtual dumping ground for international adulterated drugs.206  
In noting this disturbing trend, the Abigail court inferred a sense of alarm among 
Americans and Congress at the increasing presence of such drugs by 1848.207  
Therefore, the court cited the Import Drug Act as though Congress had designed it to 
halt the importation of all inherently dangerous drugs.208  The Import Drug Act itself 
and its legislative history, however, tell another story.  That is, Congress passed it to 
protect consumers, who deserved to get their money’s worth when buying 
international drugs.209 
Certainly, Section I of the Import Drug Act provided that the American custom-
house would examine and appraise all medicines and drugs arriving at U.S. ports.210  
                                                                
202
 See infra text accompanying notes 201-243. 
203
 Id. 
204
 Id. 
205
 Import Drug Act, 30th Cong., ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848).  The law was entitled “An Act 
to prevent the Importation of adulterated and spurious Drugs and Medicines. Id. 
206
 See Heath, supra note 126, at 169, 171-72.  European countries such as France and 
England had already passed laws designed to curb the importation of such medicines; 
therefore, more and more adulterated drugs reached American shores.  See Alex Berman, 
Drug Control in Nineteenth-Century France: Antecedents and Directions, in SAFEGUARDING 
THE PUBLIC: HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINAL DRUG CONTROL at 9 (John B. Blake ed., 
Johns Hopkins Press 1970) (noting that in the early nineteenth century, France promulgated 
national laws to eradicate adulterated drugs); see also H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 4, 9 
(recognizing London as the largest drug market in the world in 1848, and asserting that 
because of long-standing British laws against adulteration, England was likely shipping its 
inferior drugs to the U.S.). 
207
 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. 
208
 Id. at 704.  The court stated that the Act “banned ‘imported adulterated drugs’ after a 
Congressional committee concluded that ‘this country had become the grand mart and 
receptacle of all the refuse [drugs] . . . not only from the European warehouses, but from the 
whole Eastern world.’”  Id.  Although the court quoted Heath, the Committee language 
appears in H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 3 (1848).  Id. (quoting Heath, supra note 126, at 175).  
209
 See Angela Walch, A Spurious Solution to a Genuine Problem: An In-Depth Look at 
the Import Drugs Act of 1848, at 29, available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/ 
448/Walch.pdf. 
210
 Import Drug Act, supra note 205.  The Act states in pertinent part: 
[A]ll drugs, medicines, medicinal preparations, including medicinal essential oils, and 
chemical preparations used wholly or in part as medicine, imported into the United 
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The Import Drug Act, however, limited the examination and appraisal to an 
assessment of their “quality, purity, and fitness for medical purposes, as to their 
value and identity specified in the invoice.”211  A close reading of the act reveals that 
the “quality, purity, and fitness” of the drugs did not refer to any dangers that might 
                                                          
States from abroad, shall, before passing the custom-house, be examined and 
appraised, as well in reference to their quality, purity, and fitness for medical 
purposes, as to their value and identity specified in the invoice.  
 
SEC. 2.  And be it further enacted, That all medicinal preparations, whether 
chemical or otherwise, usually imported with the name of the manufacturer, shall have 
the true name of the manufacturer, and the place where they are prepared, permanently 
and legibly affixed to each parcel, by stamp, label, or otherwise; and all medicinal 
preparations imported without such names affixes as aforesaid, shall be adjudged to be 
forfeited. 
 
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That if, on examination, any drugs, medicines, 
medicinal preparations, whether chemical or otherwise, including medicinal essential 
oils, are found, in the opinion of the examiner, to be so far adulterated, or in any 
manner deteriorated, as to render them inferior in strength and purity to the standard 
established by the United States, Edinburgh, London, French, and German 
pharmacopoeias and dispensatories, and thereby improper, unsafe, or dangers to be 
used for medicinal purposes, a return to that effect shall be made upon the invoice, and 
the articles so noted shall not pass the custom-house, unless, on reexamination of a 
strictly analytical character, called for by the owner or consignee, the return of the 
examiner shall be found erroneous; and it shall be declared as the result of such 
analysis, that the said articles may properly, safely, and without danger, be used for 
medicinal purposes. 
 
SEC. 4.  And be it further enacted, That the owner or consignee shall at all times, 
when dissatisfied with the examiner’s return, have the privilege of calling, at his own 
expense, for a reexamination; and, on depositing with the collector such sum as the 
latter may deem sufficient to defray such expense, it shall be the duty of that officer to 
procure some competent analytical chemist possessing the confidence of the medical 
profession, as well as of the colleges of medicine and pharmacy, if any such 
institutions exist in the State in which the collection district is situated, a careful 
analysis of the articles included in said return, and a report upon the same under oath; 
and in case the report, which shall be final, shall declare the return of the examiner to 
be erroneous, and the said articles to be of the requisite strength and purity, according 
to the standards referr3ed to in the next preceding section orf this act, the entire 
invoice shall be passed without reservation, on payment of the customary duties; but, 
in case the examiner’s return shall be sustained by the analysis and report, the said 
articles shall remain in charge of the collector, and the owner or consignee, on 
payment of the charges of storage, and other expenses necessarily incurred by the 
United States, shall have the privilege of reexporting them at any time within the six 
months after the report of the analysis; but if the said articles shall not be sent out of 
the United States within the time specified, it shall be the duty of the collector, at the 
expiration of said time, to cause the same to be destroyed, holding the owner or 
consignee responsible to the United States for payment of all charges, in the same 
manner as if said articles had been reexported.  
Id. 
211
 Id. at § 1 (emphasis added).  
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be inherent in drugs.212  Instead, the phrase referred specifically to their economic 
valuation and their identification as reflected in the invoice accompanying the 
drugs.213   
To be sure, the words “strength and purity” reflect Congress’s apparent intent to 
exclude those drugs which were chemically ineffectual or laden with chemically 
inert materials,214 so that American consumers could know how effective the drugs 
and medicines would be215 when they self-medicated.216  Congress would have been 
aware that the strength of a drug could be diminished by long storage or exposure to 
the elements and might therefore become deteriorated to the point of inertness.217  
Meanwhile, a drug’s purity could be degraded by inert fillers like vegetable matter, 
clay, sand, and water.218  Consequently, a drug’s value could be manipulated 
dramatically without the requisite price adjustment on the shipping invoice, upon 
which the seller would nevertheless demand the price commensurate with 
unadulterated drugs.219   Indeed, a close reading of H.R. Rep. No. 30-664 reveals that 
it was such sharp practices that were the target of the Import Drug Act.220  In short, it 
appears Congress designed this section of the Import Drug Act to prevent entry 
through U.S. ports of those drugs which, in fact, did not meet the professed 
specifications under which they were sold.221  Those drugs which failed to meet the 
standards professed were thereby considered ineligible for importation.222  
                                                                
212
 Id. 
213
 Id. 
214
 See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 7 (1848); see also Walch, supra note 209, at 28. 
215
 See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 2 (1848). 
216
 See supra Part III. 
217
 See Omudhome Ogbru, What You Should Know About Drugs, http://www.medicine 
net.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=16667 (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
218
 See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 7 (1848). 
219
 Id. at 11; see also Walch, supra 209, at 30 (stating that although the Committee noted 
that deteriorated, ineffectual drugs were often sold at a lower price than that charged for purer 
products, the Committee was outraged that such materials could be sold at all to an 
unsuspecting public that bought the cheaper drugs in reliance of promises that they would 
have some medicinal effect). 
220
 See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 9-13 (1848).  The general tenor of the report can be 
summed up by the words of the doctor commissioned to report on the problem of adulterated 
foreign drugs which stated: 
Many of the foreign medicinal extracts are prepared and sold in reference to price 
rather than strength and purity.  The foreign manufacturers prepare any quality called 
for.  Compound extract of colocynth (as the label imports) comes to us in a manner 
well calculated to deceive, but, on examination, is found to contain not one particle of 
colocynth. 
Id. at 11. 
221
 See Sonnedecker, supra note 41, at 28-29. 
222
 Import Drug Act, supra note 205. 
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An examination of Section III of the Import Drug Act also reveals that 
Congress’s primary goal was to prevent misrepresentation of the value of drugs and 
medicines.223  American consumers could therefore know how effective the drugs 
and medicines would be when they self-medicated.  Section III of the Import Drug 
Act provided that drugs and medicines would not clear customs if they were “so far 
adulterated, or in any manner deteriorated, as to render them inferior in strength and 
purity to the standard established by the United States, Edinburgh, London, French, 
and German pharmacopoeias224 and dispensatories, and thereby improper, unsafe, or 
dangerous to be used for medicinal purposes.”225  
The word “adulterated” is susceptible to various interpretations, but the meaning 
Congress ascribed to it in the Import Drug Act seems to reflect Congress’s 
preoccupation with consumer protection, not patient protection.226  Congress 
assigned the term a broader meaning than that which the Abigail court ascribed to it 
when it described adulterated drugs merely as “impure,” a word that allows the facile 
inference that the Import Drug Act was designed primarily to exclude drugs that 
were contaminated with inherently dangerous ingredients.227  A close reading of 
Section III reveals, however, that the word “adulterated” referred to those drugs and 
medicines which were so “inferior in strength and purity” that they did not meet the 
efficacy standards of the various international pharmacopoeias.228  In fact, the statute 
states that by not meeting these standards of strength and purity, the drugs were 
“thereby improper, unsafe, or dangerous to be used for medicinal purposes,”229 not 
that their quality was inherently dangerous.230  Therefore, rather than a law designed 
to ensure the inherent safety of drugs, the Import Drug Act appears to have been 
designed to ensure the efficacy of drugs so that consumers would know whether they 
were getting their money’s worth.  As such, the law gives little support to the Abigail 
                                                                
223
 Id.; see also Walch, supra note 209 at 29 (stating that page after page of the House 
Committee’s Report describes the importation of many worthless drugs, and averring that the 
Committee was concerned particularly with protecting Americans from paying high prices for 
worthless drugs). 
224
 In 1820, physicians and pharmacists convened at the United States Pharmacopeial 
Convention.  HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, 
AND USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 139 (Knopf 1970).  In an effort to set standards by which 
they could determine whether particular drugs were pure and effective, they published a set of 
standards which have become the basis for several federal laws.  Id. 
225
 Import Drug Act, supra note 205, at § 3 (emphasis added). 
226
 See Walch, supra note 209, at 29 (stating that “economic concerns, rather than the 
safety, of the American people were persuasive to Congress.”).  
227
 The Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines “impure” as inter alia, “containing 
something unclean.”  
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impure 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
228
 See Import Drug Act, supra note 205, at § 3 (emphasis added). 
229
 Id. 
230
 See Sonnedecker, supra note 41, at 28-30 (emphasis added). 
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court’s stilted conclusion that the Import Drug Act represents the federal 
government’s intent to regulate drug safety in nineteenth-century America.   
2.  The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 
In 1906, Congress passed and President Theodore Roosevelt signed, the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act, also known as the Wiley Act.231  In describing the Wiley Act, 
the Abigail court mischaracterized its purpose and effect when it stated that Congress 
“passed the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, which prohibited the manufacture of any 
drug that was ‘adulterated.’”232  The court mischaracterized the Wiley Act as a drug 
safety regulation, when, in the words of James Harvey Young, the law actually 
“provided only modest controls of self-dosage medications.”233  In short, Congress 
passed the Wiley Act to protect consumers from fraud or misrepresentation.  Rather 
than being concerned about drug safety, Congress sought to “ensure that fair value 
was received for money spent.”234 
The Wiley Act prohibited the manufacture and interstate trade of “adulterated” 
drugs.235  It also prescribed, however, a particular meaning for the term “adulterated” 
that the Abigail court failed to recognize.236  The Wiley Act set out two definitions 
for “adulterated.”237  First, it stated that no drug “defined in the United States 
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary shall be deemed to be adulterated under this 
provision if the standard of strength, quality, or purity be plainly stated upon the 
bottle, box, or other container thereof although the standard may differ from that 
determined by the test laid down in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National 
Formulary.”238  Thus, a drug defined by the official pharmacopoeia could be of 
inferior “strength, quality, or purity,” but its packaging would have to disclose that 
fact.239  If it did so, the drug would not be considered “adulterated”240 and could be 
manufactured and even transported interstate.241  Second, the Wiley act stated that a 
drug would not be “adulterated” unless its “strength or purity [fell] below the 
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professed standard or quality under which it [was] sold,”242 a provision that referred 
to drugs not covered by the two pharmacopoeias mentioned above.243  As a result, 
any drug not officially recognized by the two pharmacopoeias would be considered 
unadulterated and could therefore be manufactured, transported, and sold as long as 
the seller did not misrepresent the value of the drug.244  In short, the term 
“adulterated” as used in the Wiley Act did not mean “dangerous” or even “impure,” 
which was the superficial definition assigned to it by the Abigail court.245  
The Wiley Act did little to regulate access to drugs because it was not designed to 
do so.246  It is unlikely, however, that the Abigail court recognized this fact when it 
deemed the Act one of the “early examples of federal government intervention.”247  
The federal government certainly intervened, but it did so to prevent fraud and 
misrepresentation; it did not do so to prevent access to unsafe drugs.  While it did 
require disclosure of potentially dangerous substances, the Wiley Act did not “strike 
a blow against self-medication, but sought to make it safer.”248 
3.  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments 
As noted above, Congress passed the first federal law regulating drug safety in 
1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.249  Although the 1938 law did not 
regulate the efficacy of drugs,250 the new powers it bestowed on government agencies 
were far-reaching.251  The new law provided four new safeguards when it: 1) 
commanded the use of prescriptions,252 2) required that drugs be labeled with 
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directions for safe use, 3) removed the scienter requirement for proving false 
therapeutic claims, and 4) mandated that all drugs be deemed safe before they could 
be marketed.253  Of note, the final provision regarding drug safety was introduced 
late into the proposed legislation for the 1938 law.254  That Congress included this 
crucial provision as a virtual afterthought reveals the federal government’s 
ambiguous approach to drug safety regulation even in 1938 when it passed the first 
“safety” regulation.255  Still, the new controls were stringent256 relative to those laid 
out in the corpus of laissez-faire drug laws that had flourished since the early days of 
American settlement.257  In effect, the 1938 law was the first American law that 
could be called a drug safety regulation affecting the discretion Americans had long 
enjoyed when choosing medications.  The law’s new restrictions were such that 
James Harvey Young said, “self-medication was doomed.”258   
On October 10, 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 
1938 law.259  These amendments compelled drug makers to operate under procedures 
prescribed by the FDA and required that factories submit to inspections, present 
plans for prospective clinical trials, and continuously monitor the effects of their 
drugs on patients.260  In effect, the amendments strengthened dramatically the FDA’s 
control over the regulation of drug manufacturing. 
The 1962 amendments were the first federal regulations that purported261 to 
require drug manufacturers to make a substantial showing that their drugs were 
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efficacious, not merely safe.262  This efficacy requirement prompted the Abigail court 
to state correctly, if tritely, that “even setting the safety issue to one side…, as a 
matter of history, at least some drug regulation prior to 1962 addressed efficacy.”263  
The court failed, however, to elucidate on the question of why ensuring drug efficacy 
has historically been an important government interest.  Its treatment ignores the fact 
that the history of drug regulation in the U.S. has been tied to the tradition of self-
medication and the desire to protect consumers’ pocketbooks, not their health.264 
Congress’s requirement that drug makers make a substantial showing that their 
drugs be effective suggests strongly that the 1962 law was also rooted in a desire to 
protect market consumers.  According to Louis Lasagna, the committee hearings 
leading up to the passage of the 1962 law appeared to be primarily concerned with 
“excessive drug costs, inadequate competition, price control, and patent 
protections.”265  Robert N. Mayer adds that, “the amendments were primarily 
designed to save dollars, not lives.”266  If Lasagna and Mayer are correct, then the 
efficacy requirement was largely an extension of a tradition within which the 
government had long engaged—that is, the regulation of drugs with the intent to 
protect consumers from fraud or misrepresentation.267  Therefore, the Abigail court 
was correct in stating that the government has long regulated the efficacy of drugs, 
but its intimation that it did so to ensure the safety of drugs has little support from 
history.  In fact, the court’s words reflect its misunderstanding of our country’s 
history and traditions regarding the consumption and regulation of medicines. 
V.  THE PROPOSAL 
On January 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court declined the Abigail 
Alliance’s petition for a writ of certiorari.268  By doing so, the Court failed to address 
the circuit split269 over which test courts should apply when determining whether a 
particular liberty interest is deeply rooted in our country’s history and tradition.270  
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More apropos of this paper, the Court declined to answer the salient question of 
whether terminally ill patients with no medical alternatives have a fundamental right 
of access to experimental drugs that have been deemed safe enough by Phase I 
investigative trials to continue human testing.  This refusal leaves in place a deeply 
flawed precedent.   
To be sure, the Abigail court’s mischaracterization of history reveals that its 
approach was almost wholly devoid of historical analysis.  Because it ignored this 
country’s history of self-medication and disregarded its duty to scrutinize the laws it 
cited in support of its decision, the Abigail court found no deeply-rooted tradition of 
access to experimental drugs.  In short, because of its misappropriation of history, 
the Abigail court rendered a conclusion perfectly contrary to reality.  Had the 
Supreme Court chosen to review this nation’s true history under the Glucksberg 
test,271 it would have found that access to experimental drugs had been an institution 
that for centuries was “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.”272  This 
finding would have opened the door to further constitutional analysis and the 
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prospect of subjecting FDA policies to strict scrutiny, a much higher standard than 
the rational basis standard the Abigail court used to deny terminally ill patients with 
no other alternatives a fundamental right of access to potentially life-saving drugs. 
Of course, a finding that a particular liberty interest is “deeply-rooted” does not 
dispose of the question of whether that interest merits constitutional protection.273  
Under Glucksberg, once a court determines that a particular interest is “deeply-
rooted,” it must then decide whether that interest is “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were 
sacrificed.”274   
Allowing terminally ill patients, such as Abigail, access to potentially life-saving 
drugs is a right of liberty that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”275  This 
facet of the Glucksberg test, despite its seemingly distinctive nature, is in fact closely 
related to the question of whether a liberty interest is “deeply rooted.”  For example, 
when the Glucksberg Court held that there is no fundamental right to assisted 
suicide, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the government has throughout 
American history banned, and continues to ban, assisted suicide.276  While the Court 
recognized that a liberty interest in suicide may be characterized as a right “to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life,” 277 it stressed that the mere fact that “rights and liberties…sound in 
personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all 
important, intimate, and personal decisions are [fundamental rights].”278  Thus, the 
Court recognized that a liberty interest is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
not because it involves personal autonomy deserving of protection from government 
intrusion, but because it involves a personal liberty that is grounded in history and 
tradition—a construction that supports the Abigail Alliance’s pursuit of access to 
experimental drugs.  To be sure, American history reflects a long tradition in which 
Americans enjoyed personal access to drugs.279  More than that, Americans’ right of 
self-medication was recognized and furthered by government regulations intended to 
promote consumer confidence.280  As such, a court that establishes the fundamental 
liberty the Abigail Alliance seeks would be recognizing a liberty interest in personal 
autonomy, as well as the tradition that has for centuries supported this freedom. 
Finally, under Glucksberg, the Abigail Alliance would also have to submit a 
“careful description of the asserted fundamental interest” it seeks to establish.281 
Although the Abigail court failed to reach this aspect of the Glucksberg test, the 
court asserted that the Abigail Alliance would likely be unable to make such a 
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showing because access to experimental drugs would depend on the FDA’s 
regulatory determinations regarding the drug’s safety and efficacy.282  The court 
asked, “How can a constitutional right be defined by an administrative regulation 
that is subject to change?”283  In addition, the court found it “difficult to imagine how 
a right inextricably entangled with the details of shifting administrative regulations 
could be deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”284  
The Abigail court failed to recognize that fundamental interests such as the one 
the Abigail Alliance seeks have been carefully described with regard to medical 
experts’ evolving understanding of medicine and pharmacology.  In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,285 the Supreme Court upheld Roe v. Wade286 and recognized 
that a woman’s right to choose to abort a pre-viable fetus shall not be unduly 
burdened by government interference.287  That the Casey Court did not grant an 
absolute right to abortion288 is instructive.  While it recognized the fundamental right 
of access to an abortion, the Casey Court qualified that right by reference to medical 
principles surrounding the viability of the fetus and concerns over the mother’s 
health.289  In short, the government’s interests in potential life and in the mother’s 
health are circumscribed by medical opinions regarding fetal viability and the health 
of the mother.290  That doctors make such determinations is indicative of their role in 
carefully describing the mother’s liberty interest in having an abortion.   
The fundamental right the Abigail Alliance seeks to establish is similar to the 
right recognized in Casey.  That is, the right that terminally ill patients seek in 
gaining access to experimental drugs is analogous to a woman’s right to choose 
abortion under certain circumstances.  It is important to note that the Abigail 
Alliance does not advocate absolute access to all drugs not proven safe; it merely 
seeks access to post-Phase I drugs that have been deemed sufficiently safe for 
continued experimentation on humans.  The determinations that the FDA’s medical 
experts make with regard to a drug’s safety and efficacy are analogous to that which 
medical experts make with regard to whether a woman’s request for an abortion is 
medically advisable.  More specifically, determinations over whether continued 
human testing of post-Phase I drugs is advisable are analogous to determinations 
over whether a fetus is viable, or whether a woman’s health will be inadvisably 
compromised by an invasive abortion.  Yet the fundamental right to government-
fettered access to an abortion is widely-recognized, while the patient who is 
breathing her last breath is denied access to potentially life-saving post-Phase I 
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drugs.  Rather than resting on concerns surrounding patients’ health, it appears this 
artificial distinction rests largely on administrative, bureaucratic, and economic 
reasons having little to do with the impact that a carefully described right of access 
might entail.291   
The Abigail Alliance does not seek a liberty interest for the general public in 
obtaining access to experimental drugs.  Rather, it seeks to establish a liberty interest 
for those terminally ill patients who have no life-saving alternatives and who consent 
to consume post-Phase I experimental drugs.292   Like patients who seek abortions, 
these patients would act under the direction of their personal physicians, who are 
best-situated to make the determination that under the circumstances post-Phase I 
experimental drugs are the best alternative to dying.  Abigail’s doctor made that 
determination for her.293  Had he had his way, she might be alive today.   
Were a court to determine that the liberty interest the Abigail Alliance seeks is 
fundamental, it would still need to decide whether the FDA policy is constitutional.  
That is, it must strictly scrutinize the FDA’s denial of access to terminally ill patients 
who seek to consume post-Phase I experimental drugs.  Such an exercise would 
entail greater effort and analysis than that displayed by the court in Abigail. 
To determine the constitutionality of the FDA regulations, the court must 
determine whether those policies are narrowly tailored to furthering a compelling 
government interest.294  Of course, the court may find the policies pass such 
constitutional muster by finding that the fundamental right of access to potentially 
life-saving drugs must yield to the state’s interests in preserving public health.  
Applying the Glucksberg test to the true history and tradition regarding self-
medication and the lack of drug safety regulations, however, would require a court to 
make that difficult determination by weighing terminally ill patients’ weighty 
interest in survival against the government’s interest in prohibiting this particular 
group’s access to potential cures.   
If the thrust of the FDA policy is to protect the general public health, then it 
sweeps too broadly.  The FDA has the alternative to narrow its prohibition on post-
Phase I experimental drugs to exclude those who are not both terminally ill and 
willing to undergo post-Phase I clinical trials, which are regularly made available to 
those patients the FDA has deemed suitable test subjects.  That the FDA allows post-
Phase I drugs to be administered to willing test subjects demonstrates its willingness 
to accept risks to patients who themselves knowingly assume the risks.  As the 
Abigail Alliance has stated, all that it seeks is a  
right for terminally ill patients with no remaining treatment options to 
fight for their own lives, by taking a drug that their doctors have 
concluded is justified by the available scientific evidence and that the 
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FDA itself would let them take if they were lucky or well-connected 
enough to get a spot in the trial.295   
This statement reflects the frustrations that patients, such as Abigail, feel when 
they are denied access to a drug that is indeed being administered to human test 
subjects.  As Abigail’s failure to be accepted as a subject indicates,296 many patients 
are understandably frustrated when they are excluded for reasons associated with a 
drug’s marketability, not for an overweening concern for patient safety.   
Finding that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right of access to 
experimental drugs would not mean a return to the days of governmental laissez-
faire regulation of drugs.  The government surely maintains strong interests in 
regulating the sale and ingestion of drugs generally.  Its interests in regulating 
narcotics are surely compelling and would outweigh the public’s interest in ingesting 
such substances without strict oversight.  Similarly, the government’s interests in 
withholding access to experimental drugs would outweigh the general public’s right 
of access to them.  Absent the strong interest in self-preservation, the interest in 
seeking access to experimental drugs would be outweighed by the government’s 
concern for patient safety.  Indeed, courts may justifiably deny such access even as 
they recognize that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right of access to 
potentially life-saving cures that have passed Phase-I of the FDA’s testing regime. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Abigail court declared that to prove its claim, the Abigail Alliance would 
need to show “that there is a tradition of access to drugs that have not yet been 
proven effective, but also a tradition of access to drugs that have not yet been proven 
safe.”297  American history bears proof of both—that is, a cultural institution of self-
medication, as well as government’s accommodation and protection of that tradition.   
American history reveals that British colonists came to America with a wealth of 
personal medical knowledge, and the custom of medical self-treatment that had been 
and would for long continue to be their tradition.298  Such traditions flourished in the 
New World of frontier living, experimentation, and laissez-faire economics.  
Meanwhile, the American laissez-faire attitude strengthened the belief that 
Americans expected government would not interfere with their right to self-
medication.  It is perhaps true, as the Abigail court noted, that the “lack of prior 
governmental regulation of an activity tells us little about whether the activity merits 
constitutional protection.”299  This statement assumes, however, that the Abigail 
Alliance’s argument rests on the proposition that government assumed a completely 
laissez-faire approach to drug regulation.  It did not.  For the greater part of 
American history, government regulation of drugs rested on protectionist principles 
and was designed to guard against charlatans who preyed on unsuspecting 
Americans seeking potential cures.  Early American state and federal governments 
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often stepped in to regulate medical fees and drug costs because they recognized that 
citizens regularly engaged in such choices.  Therefore, the government’s laissez-faire 
approach to drug regulation involved recognition of the right of self-medication.300  
Drug safety regulation did not begin until 1938301 and any regulations dealing with 
the efficacy of drugs were aimed at ensuring that Americans received fair value, that 
is, that they did not pay for fraudulent therapeutic claims.302 
Despite this unmistakable history, the Abigail court found no “deeply rooted” 
tradition that would support the Abigail Alliance’s position.  It is therefore ironic that 
the court began its analysis by noting that, “the Supreme Court has directed courts to 
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”303  
In short, courts exploring the expansion of substantive due process rights must 
exercise extraordinary caution.  While it is natural for a court facing such a question 
to be wary of the consequences that attend the recognition of substantive rights, the 
caveat does not amount to a license to courts to abdicate their responsibility of 
carefully analyzing the issue and the facts at hand.  
In summary, the Abigail court’s holding was founded on faulty conclusions about 
American history.  A court reviewing the Abigail Alliance’s case under Glucksberg 
must apply an accurate account of our nation’s history.  By doing so, the court will 
be able to find that there is a deeply-rooted tradition of self-medication and laissez-
faire drug regulation in this country, and will then be able to proceed with the 
appropriate constitutional analysis.  Such an analysis would produce the conclusion 
that a particular group of persons indeed has a fundamental right of access to 
experimental drugs.  These are terminally ill people who, having no life-saving 
options, consent to consume post-Phase I experimental drugs under the care of 
physicians trying to save their lives. 
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 Id. at Part IV.C.  The Abigail court noted that the lack of regulation does not 
presuppose that a right is historically rooted.  See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 706.  This 
paper, however, has illuminated the history of self-medication in the United States and has 
revealed government’s accommodating, laissez-faire policy toward drug safety regulation.  See 
supra Parts III and IV.  Moreover, it has shown that state and local governments certainly 
passed drug regulations, but these were usually laws prohibiting pharmacists and apothecaries 
from charging exorbitant fees, selling mislabeled or unmarked products, or defrauding 
customers.  See id. at Part IV.  Thus, there is in the United States a long tradition of regulating 
drugs with regard to their marketability, not their safety.  In short, the Abigail court was wrong 
to assume that there has been a lack of government drug regulation in general.  
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